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I. INTRODUCTION
Hazards facing today's motorist force upon him casualty
counts unmatched by those of even the most fierce of wartime
battles. Statistics from the National Safety Council show that
during 1974, 46,200 persons died in traffic accidents while 1.8
million suffered disabling injuries.' Total costs resulting from the
accident toll climbed to $20.2 billion.' Estimates for the first
quarter of 1975 indicate that the staggering trend will continue,
despite reduced speed limits occasioned by fuel energy conserva-
tion efforts. Traffic deaths for the first 3 months reached 9,460,
disabling injuries were estimated at about 350,000, and accident
costs ran to slightly over $3.4 billion.
3
The figures readily amplify the fact that one of the most
critical socio-economic and legal problems facing modern society
1. Recht, 1974 the Year of the Big Turnaround, TiAmc SAFETY, March, 1975, at 17.
2. Id. In its annual report the South Carolina Highway Department stated that
during 1974, 76,986 accidents occurred on the highways of South Carolina resulting in 873
fatalities, 18,863 injuries, and an economic loss of $180,000,000. SouTH CAROLINA TRAFFIC
ACCIDENTS, 1974.
3. Recht, March Deaths Go Up 2 Per Cent, TRAFFIC SAFETY, June, 1975, at 28.
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is that of compensating victims of automobile accidents. In the
past, various methods have been employed to provide protection
for traffic victims. However, the continued presence of the finan-
cially irresponsible motorist has prevented a total solution from
being reached. Moreover, the gravity of the problem confronting
society is acutely recognized when one considers that, although
in 1964 there were over 87 million registered motor vehicles and
approximately 95 million licensed drivers it has been estimated
that in 1974 there were about 135 million vehicles and about 126
million drivers on the highways of the United States.4
In 1972, the South Carolina General Assembly by concurrent
resolution established a special committee to study the automo-
bile insurance system in South Carolina and to recommend a
legislative program of automobile insurance reform.5 Recognizing
that the problems inherent in the South Carolina system were
far-reaching and interrelated,6 the Committee undertook exten-
sive, first-hand investigation into the insurance programs of
states having problems similar to those of South Carolina. Al-
though the Committee introduced a bill during the closing weeks
of the 1973 session, passage of the bill was not gained until the
summer of 1974.1 The Automobile Reparation Reform Act not
4. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, TRAFFIC ACCmENT FACTS (1974 Digest), at 2.
5. Concurrent Resolution S-674, 99th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (1972).
6. As the Committee was soon to learn, the problem with automobile insur-
ance in South Carolina wasn't simply the problem of the Assigned Risk Plan or
even whether or not to adopt no-fault insurance. There were also problems of
the complete availability of automobile insurance to the South Carolina motor-
ist; the problem of the uninsured motorist and the habitual offender; the prob-
lem of automobile insurance premium rates. Every issue was like a tentacle
growing out from a key issue-automobile insurance.
COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLANS INCLUDING
THE NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SYSTEM, 99TH GEN. ASSEMBLY OF S.C., 2d SESs.,
SECOND REPORT at 1 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as SECOND REPORT]. As one
authority has noted:
The primary areas of most serious concern to the insureds are generally
stated to be:
1. Difficulties of some individuals or groups in obtaining insurance,
cancellations, or non-renewals of policies, and other manifestations of a
"tight" or selective insurance market.
2. Rising premium rates, which some critics claim are approaching
"prohibitive" levels, for a product generally regarded as a social necess-
ity.
3. Inequities and unreasonable delays in compensation of accident vic-
tims, together with court congestion, high legal costs, and related prob-
lems attendant upon litigation of negligent liability cases.
J. INS. INFORMATION, Jan.-Feb., 1968, at 19.
7. No. 1177, [1974] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2718.
[Vol. 27
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only mandated first party economic loss coverage and established
compulsory insurance, but also abolished the state's assigned risk
plan and substituted a reinsurance facility to provide insurance
for the residual market.
The purpose of this note is twofold. First, the need for com-
pulsory insurance in South Carolina will be examined from the
perspective of the failure of earlier insurance systems to ade-
quately compensate the victims of automobile accidents. Second,
the provisions of the Automobile Reparation Reform Act will be
analyzed with emphasis on the alterations which the Act necessi-
tated in the prior systems and on South Carolina's new approach
to the problem of the residual market. Subsidiary provisions to
be discussed include those for the undesirable insured, family
immunity, consumer protection, and the recently promulgated
rate structure, including the merit-rating system.
II. FINANCIAL RESPONSIILrrY LAWS
As early as 1925, the state of Connecticut, in recognition of
the problem posed by the financially irresponsible driver, enacted
the first "safety responsibility law."' By the year of the Columbia
Report in 1932,1 18 states had followed suit.10 Presently, all 50
states and the District of Columbia have some form of financial
responsibility statute."
8. CONN. PUBLIC ACr ch. 183 (1925). Financial responsibility laws were designed origi-
nally not only to assure compensation to victims of accidents but also to aid in accident
prevention; hence, they were frequently referred to as "safety-responsibility laws." Grad,
Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 300, 305
& n.17 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Grad].
9. REPORT BY THE COMMrrrEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AuTOMOBILE AcCIDENTS,
(Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences 1932).
The study showed that there was little chance of recovery from any but insured
motorists and brought out the hardships to the injured person and his depen-
dents resulting both from his not collecting damages and from the delays and
costs of recovery. It indicated the burden cast on public and private relief by
injuries for which no damages were paid. The study covered the various plans
then existing to improve the situation, through financial responsibility laws and
through the then recent Massachusetts Compulsory Insurance Law, and in-
cluded a statistical study of the effects of the Massachusetts law and of the
various financial responsibility laws then in effect.
Grad, supra note 8, at 300.
10. Grad, supra note 8, at 307.
11. Note, A Survey of Financial Responsibility Laws and Compensation of Traffic
Victims: A Proposal for Reform, 21 VAND. L. REv. 1050 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 21
VAND. L. REV.].
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These early responsibility laws, which were known as "proof-
type" statutes, required a motorist who failed to satisfy a judg-
ment resulting from an accident or who was convicted of a serious
driving violation to file proof of his financial ability to pay judg-
ments arising from future accidents or, in default of such proof,
to suffer the revocation of his license and suspension of his auto-
mobile registration.' 2 Promoted vigorously by the insurance in-
dustry, these statutes were designed not only to provide compen-
sation to accident victims but also to promote accident preven-
tion. 3 Assuming that there existed a bad class of drivers who
would be isolated by allowing each member to have one accident,
advocates of these laws maintained that their enactment would
decrease the number of accidents by eliminating the bad driver,
increase the proportion of insured vehicles and drivers, and cause
the payment of more accident claims. 4
Upon implementation of these laws, however, their inherent
inadequacies became apparent and considerable criticism en-
sued. 5 An obvious deficiency was the fact that the victim of the
12. R. Hayes, Are the Financial Responsibility Laws in Need of Revision?-Two
Recent Supreme Court Cases May Indicate Such a Result, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 617, 618
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Hayes].
13. W. Aberg, Effects of and Problems from Financial Responsibility Laws, 19,13 INs.
LAW J., at 72.
14. 21 VAND. L. REV., supra note 11, at 1051.
15. As one authority put it:
Although financial responsibility legislation had been on trial for no more
than seven years when the Columbia Report was published, its weaknesses had
become so readily apparent that later writers have not added substantially to
the criticisms offered by the Columbia Committee. It found that, even assuming
an habitually careless class of drivers to exist, financial responsibility laws as
then constituted were not effective in segregating it; there was no evidence that
such legislation did operate to compel careless drivers to insure, nor did it cause
any general voluntary increase in the carrying of liability insurance. Where
motorists actually came under compulsion of the law, administrative weak-
nesses in the legislation would frequently render it ineffective, for many such
drivers would fail to surrender registration plates and license cards, or would
continue to operate vehicles in violation of the law. This situation was found
particularly acute where the driver was not the owner, and hence could not be
compelled to insure the vehicle. Furthermore, since a motorist who had had an
accident could always elect to leave the highway, financial responsibility laws
carried no guarantee that a victim would recover a judgment or that such a
judgment would be satisfied. The "first" accident victim was left especially
unprotected. Finally, the Committee found that one of the main purposes of the
law was completely unfulfilled, for there was no evidence of a decrease in the
number of accidents or of any relationship whatsoever between the number of
accidents and the number of license revocations or suspensions.
Grad, supra note 8, at 306.
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uninsured motorist's first accident was usually left without a
remedy. Since the statute operated only to require the uninsured
motorist to prove his ability to pay damages resulting from future
accidents, the driver was allowed "one free bite." It was "of little
solace to the injured victim to know that the negligent driver who
was responsible would have to insure for the protection of future
victims."' A further serious shortcoming was the failure of the
provisions of these "proof-type" statutes to take effect until a
judgment had actually been rendered and left unsatisfied. "Most
accident victims assayed the financial position of their injuries
before bringing suit, and few were willing to go to the time and
expense of suing a defendant who appeared judgment-proof."' 7
Furthermore, the administrative provisions of the laws impeded
enforcement. The effectiveness of the laws depended on accurate
accident reporting by the injured party who, upon finding himself
with no remedy, felt little incentive to file the report with the
highway department."8 Thus, the victim of an uninsured motor-
ist's first accident generally made little effort to enforce what he
viewed as a hollow statute, and as a result, the very driver at
whom the new acts were aimed often went untouched by its sanc-
tions. 9
In response to the weaknesses of the postjudgment financial
16. 21 VAND. L. REv., supra note 11, at 1052.
17. Comment, Financial Responsibility Law in Constitutional Perspective, 61 CAL.
L. REV. 1072, 1074 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 61 CAL. L. Rav.].
18. 21 VAND. L. REV., supra note 11, at 1052.
Administrative weaknesses rendered these laws ineffective even within
their own limits. Accurate accident reporting, on which financial responsibility
laws depend, has nowhere been fully achieved since reporting of accidents is
largely a matter of private initiative by injured parties and becomes a pressure
device to secure the payment of judgments. But where there are no assets or
insurance to satisfy an eventual judgment, or where a settlement has been
made, the private incentive to report the accident is lacking, and even motorists
who were clearly at fault are never forced to insure. Moreover, these laws fre-
quently contain liberal provisions for installment payments on judgments so
that the possibility of license revocation is substantially reduced. Other inherent
difficulties include lack of coordination between the courts and the motor vehi-
cle commissioner, leaving it to the insured party to file the record of conviction
or adverse judgment with the commissioner. Where proof of financial responsi-
bility is actually given, the possibility of policy cancellation or lapse presents a
serious problem and requires the close attention of the motor vehicle commis-
sioner if the provisions for surrender of licenses and registrations are to be
adequately enforced.
Grad, supra note 8, at 306-07.
19. 61 CAL. L. Rzv., supra note 17, at 1074.
1976]
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responsibility remedies, the state of New Hampshire in 1937 en-
acted a more stringent type of financial responsibility statute
which virtually, if not literally, mandated liability insurance.
2
1
This statute, and others patterned after it, was called a "security-
type" statute, because it required a driver who was involved in
an accident resulting in personal injury and property damage
exceeding a minimum statutory amount, to deposit security,
21
thereby demonstrating his ability to pay a potential judgment
arising out of that accident. Most jurisdictions which have en-
acted similar statutes do not initially require proof of future fin-
ancial responsibility on the basis of the mere involvement in an
accident. However, if the motorist is convicted of a serious traffic
violation or the injured party chooses to sue the defendant and
obtain a judgment, he then must not only satisfy the past judg-
ment but also must give proof of his financial responsibility for a
specified length of time, ranging from 1 year to an indefinite
period.
22
Patterned closely after New Hampshire's statute, the South
Carolina Safety Responsibility Act does not affect South Carolina
motorists until they are involved "in an accident resulting in
injury to or death of any person or total property damage to an
apparent extent of $100 or more .... -12 Unlike the statutes of
most jurisdictions, however, the law in South Carolina requires
the motorist not only to deposit security but also to demonstrate
his financial responsibility for the future. 24 Within 5 days after the
20. N.H. LAWS ch. 161 (1937). By 1943, similar acts were adopted by Indiana, Maine,
Michigan, New York, Oregon, and Vermont. The American Automobile Association incor-
porated similar provisions into many of its model safety responsibility bills, and in 1944
the Uniform Vehicle Code was amended to include a security provision.
Eventually, every state in the nation, except Massachusetts, adopted a form of the
prejudgment security statute. For a detailed breakdown and study of the various provi-
sions of the different states, see Appendix B, R. KEETON and J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTEC-
TION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
21. Of course, no security deposit is required if the owner of the vehicle has a valid
liability insurance policy at the time of the accident. Most jurisdictions require a security
deposit from both the driver and the owner of the vehicle, and impose the requirement
regardless of fault. However, a number of states require some preliminary finding of
probable fault by the commissioner before the security requirement becomes applicable.
22. Grad, supra note 8, at 310. The most common period required is 3 years.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-721 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
24. Among those states requiring both a security deposit and a demonstration of
financial responsibility for the future are Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. See Chart, AM. INS. ASS'N., ANALYSIS
OF LAws RELATING TO AuroMOBILE INSURANCE (Dec., 1974).
[Vol. 27
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occurrence, the driver is required to forward a written report of
the accident to the Highway Department. Section 46-722 further
provides that upon receipt of the accident report, the Highway
Department must "within sixty days thereafter, suspend the li-
cense of each operator or driver and all registration of each owner
of a motor vehicle involved in such accident" and revoke a non-
resident's privilege of operating his motor vehicle in South Caro-
lina unless:
(a) such operator, driver or owner or both shall deposit security
in a sum not less than two hundred and fifty dollars or such
additional amount as the Department may specify that will be
sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be recovered for
damages resulting from the accident which may be recovered
against the operator or owner and
(b) such owner and operator shall immediately give and there-
after maintain proof of financial responsibility on all motor ve-
hicles owned or operated by them.2
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-722 (Cum. Supp. 1973). Although this section would provide
compensation to the victim of a "first" accident and furthermore would insure payment
of adequate relief in the case of a future accident, its effect is severely diminished by the
exceptions created by the section following it:
§ 46-723. Same; exceptions.-Section 46-722 shall not apply to any of the follow-
ing:
(1) To the operator or owner if the owner had in effect at the time of
the accident an automobile liability policy with respect to the motor
vehicle involved in the accident;
(2) To the operator, if not the owner of the motor vehicle, if there was
in effect at the time of the accident an automobile liability policy or bond
with respect to his operation of motor vehicles not owned by him;
(3) To the operator or owner if the liability of the operator or owner for
damages resulting from the accident is, in the judgment of the Depart-
ment, covered by any other form of liability insurance policy or bond;
(4) To any person qualifying as a self-insurer under § 46-709 of this
chapter;
(5) To the operator or owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident
wherein no injury or damage was caused to the person or property of any
one other than such owner or operator;
(6) To the owner of a motor vehicle if at the time of the accident the
vehicle was being operated without his permission, express or implied, or
was parked by a person who had been operating the motor vehicle without
his permission, express or implied;
(7) If, before the date that the Department would othervise suspend the
license and registration or non-resident's operating privilege under § 46-
722 there shall be filed with the Department evidence satisfactory to it
that the person who would otherwise have to file security (a) has been
released from liability, (b) has been finally adjudicated not to be liable,
(c) has executed a warrant for confession of judgment, payable when and
in such installments as the parties have agreed to or (d) has executed a
7
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Subsequent sections of the law specifically designate the
additional events which will trigger the demonstration of the re-
quired proof. Section 46-735 provides that all courts in which a
judgment is rendered and left unsatisfied for a period of 60 days
must immediately forward a copy of the judgment to the High-
way Department. Upon receipt, the Department is authorized to
suspend the license and registration of any person against whom
the judgment is rendered. 26 Section 46-744 sets forth a further
circumstance requiring proof of future financial ability by provid-
ing that if the South Carolina Highway Department, under any
law of the state, suspends or revokes the license of any person
upon receiving a record of conviction, or a forfeiture of bail, it
must also suspend the registration unless that person has pre-
viously given or shall immediately give and thereafter maintain
proof of financial responsibility with respect to all motor vehicles
registered by him. This registration remains suspended until he
gives and maintains proof of future financial responsibility.27
Although "security-type" financial responsibility statutes
have been consistently sustained upon constitutional grounds in
the overwhelming majority of the courts, 2 their inadequacies, like
duly acknowledged written agreement, providing for the payment of an
agreed amount in installments, with respect to all claims for injuries or
damages resulting from the accident; or
(8) To the owner of any legally parked vehicle when struck by another
vehicle.
Thus, if the driver falls into one of the above-stated situations, he may ignore the require-
ments of § 46-722.
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-737 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
27. Section 46-747 provides that proof of financial responsibility may be given by (1)
obtaining a certified insurance policy, (2) filing a bond, or (3) filing a certificate of deposit
of money or securities.
28. In the past, the courts have concluded that enactment of the statutes is a reasona-
ble exercise of a state's police power and thus have held that these laws do not violate:
the equal protection clause, Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); Surtman
v. Secretary of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471 (1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 806
(1944); the due process clause, Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), Hadden v. Aitker, 156
Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952); the provision against self-incrimination, Surtman v.
Secretary of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471 (1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 806 (1944);
or the prohibition against imprisonment for a civil debt, Sullivan v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468,
135 S.W.2d 930 (1940). The statutes have also been found not to constitute an improper
delegation of judicial power to an administrative body, Escobedo v. State Department of
Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950), nor to be special legislation, Watson v.
Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 P. 481 (1931).
In this regard, however, two recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the validity
of the statutes may not be sustained in the future. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
the Court determined that Georgia's statute violated petitioner's riqht to procedural due
8
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those of the earlier "proof-type" statutes, are clearly evident in
terms of providing compensation to accident victims. While the
primary purpose of these statutes is to aid the victim of the first
accident, even here there is no assurance that he will be compen-
sated for his injuries. Forcing the payment of security for the first
accident does exert some pressure on the uninsured motorist, but
there is no statutory provision compelling the operator or driver
to secure insurance until he is actually involved in an accident.29
The statutes tend to be remedial rather than preventive, because
they operate after the fact and still allow the uninsured motorist
one "free accident." Other critical weaknesses of the laws are
their inherent gaps. Victims of the hit-and-run driver are left with
no known tortfeasor against whom he can invoke the law. Addi-
tionally, the laws provide no remedy to those injured by an unin-
sured driver of a stolen vehicle or a driver who operated a vehicle
without the consent of the insured, "as well as those cases where
the insurer disclaims liability or denies coverage after loss." 0
A. Uninsured Motorist Provisions
Although the rigorous enforcement of the "security-type" of
financial responsibility laws did induce substantial majorities of
the motorists in the various states to obtain insurance, the actual
number of uninsured motorists continued to increase as the mo-
toring public rapidly grew in the period following World War H.'
As a result,
pressures began to develop for legislation directed at compensa-
tion rather than control-that is, for the adoption of some state
sponsored plan which would assure indemnification for all those
process. A week later, in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), the Court found that
the Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act of Arizona directly conflicted with the Federal
Bankruptcy Act and was, therefore, unconstitutional as violative of the Supremacy
Clause. To date, no case has been brought challenging the constitutionality of the respon-
sibility statute in South Carolina. See, G. PETERSON, THE FINANC L RESPONSIBILITY LAws:
A TIMELY REPRISAL OF A DISCRIMINATORY SCHEME 298 (1972).
An extensive study of the constitutional questions raised by financial responsibility
statutes may be found in Annot., 35 A.L.R. 2d 1011 (1954).
29. However, the Acts did have a direct effect on the uninsured motorist who was
unable to deposit security for the damages of his first accident, for he was required to stay
off the highway until he was either exonerated by a court or satisfied all claims against
him.
30. 21 VAND. L. REV., supra note 11, at 1057.
31. A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTOuRST COVERAGE 10 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as WIDISS].
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who were injured by uninsured motorists, through the distribu-
tion of at least part of the economic cost of such injuries to the
entire community of motorists.2
The enactment of compulsory insurance laws as well as statutes
providing for the maintenance of unsatisfied judgment funds was
strongly advocated." Many argued in addition that the problem
of the financially irresponsible driver could best be eliminated by
developing a proposal that would allow compensation without
regard to fault."
In the early fifties, the state of New York began moving
toward a system of compulsory insurance when Thomas E.
Dewey, then governor of the state, announced his support for the
program. 5 In an effort to forestall the enactment of compulsory
insurance, a group of New York insurance companies in 1955
voluntarily instituted uninsured motorist coverage.36 Although
representatives of the insurance industry argued that the availa-
bility of the uninsured motorist provisions was sufficient to deal
with the problem, the New York Legislature in 1956 enacted a
compulsory insurance requirement." Within two years following
New York's adoption of the law, the insurance industry, deter-
mined to avoid the enactment of similar insurance systems in
other states, made the new uninsured motorist protection gener-
ally available throughout the United States. 8 This approach to
solving the problem of the financially irresponsible motorist was
32. Id.
33. Legislation, Compulsory Liability Automobile Insurance in New York, 26
FoRDHAMt L. REv. 170 (1957); Note, Compulsory Insurance in New York, 8 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 223 (1957); Notman, A Decennial Study of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 43
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5 (1967-8); Risjud and Austin, The Problem of the Financially
Irresponsible Motorist, 24 U. KAN. CiTY L. REv. 82 (1955-6).
In general, an unsatisfied judgment fund is created by sums covered by the insurance
industry as an add-on cost to the registration fee. It is most frequently used in conjunction
with either compulsory insurance or uninsured motorist protection in order to fill the
loopholes left by their statutes. The four statutes having such funds are Maryland (MD.
ANN. CODES ACr, 66 / §§ 7-601 to -635 (1957)); Michigan (MICH. CoM. LAWS §§ 257.1101
to 1131 (Supp. 1965)); New Jersey (N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 39-6-61 to 39-6-104 (Supp. 1971));
and North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-17-01 to 39-17-10 (Supp. 1971)).
34. Note, The South Carolina Insurance Reform Act (Part I): "No Fault" and Contri-
butory Negligence-A Synopsis and Appraisal, 26 S.C.L. REv. 705, 708-09 (1975).
35. WIDSs, supra note 31, at 11.
36. Caverly, New Provisions for Protection from Injuries Inflicted by an Uninsured
Automobile, 1956 INs. LAW J. at 19, 23.
37. N.Y. VEH. & TRAFFIC LAW §§ 93 to 93-k (Supp. 1956).
38. WmIss, supra note 31, at 14 & n.32.
[Vol. 27
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met with rapid acceptance. In 1957, New Hampshire enacted the
first mandatory uninsured motorist law,39 and was followed
within 11 years by 46 other states."0
Under these statutes, the coverage provided by uninsured
motorist provisions becomes operative when an insured (or others
named in the policy) is injured due to the use, ownership, or
operation of an uninsured motor vehicle. The endorsement gener-
ally covers compensation for death, personal injury, sickness and
disease within limits corresponding to the minimum require-
ments of the state's financial responsibility law. 41 Throughout the
states, the uninsured motorist statutes tend to incorporate the
same provisions.4" Generally, they provide that no policy or con-
tract:
shall be issued or delivered unless it contains a provision by
endorsement or otherwise, herein referred to as the uninsured
motorist provision, undertaking to pay the insured all sums
which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. .... 11
Thus, recovery is permitted under the individual's own policy if
he is legally entitled to recover damages from the uninsured mo-
torist. By predicating one's right to compensation on the existing
system of negligence, recovery depends on a finding of another's
fault.4 The claimant's rights under the endorsement do not, how-
39. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268.1 (Also N.H. LAws 1955, § 76.1).
40. WIDISs, supra note 31, at 15.
41. Such limitation on the amount of recovery has been noted as an inadequacy of
uninsured motorist coverage:
This, of course, means the purchaser who desires extensive liability protection
is able to secure insurance that protects him in the event that a claim is made
against him for his own negligence, but is unable to acquire from the same
company uninsured motorist insurance that would afford a comparable amount
of protection in the event that a family member is injured by an uninsured
motorist. This has been, and continues to be, an undesirable limitation on the
scope of the coverage provided by the uninsured motorist endorsement.
A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COvERAGE at 1 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as WIDISS SUPPLEMENT].
42. Numerous articles have been written on uninsured motorist statutes providing
extensive discussion on the scope of coverage, exclusions, defenses, and limitations upon
recovery. See, e.g., Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 34 INs. COUNSEL J. 57 (1967);
Graham, The Uninsured Motorist Endorsement: Its Terms and the Developing Case Law,
19 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 85 (1968); Notman, A Decennial Study of the Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 5 (1967-8).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.33 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
44. Although South Carolina has adopted a modified form of "no-fault" legislation,
the provisions do not abolish the plaintiff's requirement of proving the defendant's negli-
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ever, rest on his securing a prior judgment against the uninsured
driver, nor on a showing that the offending motorist is unable to
pay. Rather, compensation under the uninsured motorist cover-
age is conditioned on whether the damages were caused by the
uninsured motorist.
The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Law was enacted in
1959.11 Adopted as an amendment to the Safety Responsibility
Law, the statute was substantially amended in 196311 and again
in 1971.11 The present statute, which for the most part was left
untouched by the 1974 Automobile Reparation Reform Act, con-
tinues South Carolina's mandatory requirements of uninsured
motorist coverage. Similar to other jurisdictions, the South Caro-
lina Act provides that the insured may recover all sums to which
he is legally entitled as damages from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle within the limits specified in the finan-
cial responsibility requirements. The burden of providing this
gence. However, in those jurisdictions which have established a true "no-fault" system,
one author has suggested that uninsured coverage will apply to those accidents involving
the financially irresponsible where the damages exceed the coverage provided by the no-
fault insurance. See WIDISS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 41, at 2.
45. No. 311, [1959] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 567, amending No. 723, [1952], S.C. Acts
& Jt. Res. 1853. Amended in minor respects in 1960, No. 803, [1960] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res.
1902, the law required all insurance policies issued after January 1, 1961 to include:
an endorsement or provision undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle, within limits which shall be no less than [ten thou-
sand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person, twenty thousand
dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one
accident, or five thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property
of others in any one accident.]
Additionally, the spouse, relative of either if a resident of the same household, and
any passenger in the insured vehicle were covered. Losses sustained were to be paid by
the insurance company carrying the policy on the insured person (or others named in the
policy) involved in the accident.
The law provided for the maintenance of an uninsured motorist fund, created by the
payment of $20 by all persons operating an uninsured motor vehicle in the state. The fund,
which was under the supervision and control of the state insurance commissioner, was to
be annually distributed, after administration costs, to the various insurance companies
in proportion to the number of policies bearing the endorsement written by each company
to the total number of policies for the preceding year.
While the statute forbade arbitration, the insurance companies were allowed to re-
serve a right of subrogation and thus subsequently proceed against the uninsured motorist
to the extent of the amount paid on the loss. For a general discussion of this early law,
see Patterson, The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Act, 13 S.C.L.Q. 528 (1961).
46. No. 312, [1963] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 526. For an excellent article on the statute
as it existed in 1963, see Doar and Richardson, The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist
Law, 15 S.C.L. REV. 739 (1963).
47. No. 458, [1971] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 854.
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coverage is placed on the insurance companies, who until 1971
were reimbursed in part from the uninsured motorist fund." In
that year, the General Assembly provided that an uninsured mo-
torist premium of $3 would be charged to the purchaser by the
insurer to defray the cost of providing the additional coverage.49
Section 4(a) of the 1972 Automobile Reparation Reform Act de-
creased the uninsured motorist premium to $2.50, $1 of which is
to be transferred to the Highway Department to provide funds for
the enforcing and administering of the 1972 Automobile Repara-
tion Reform Act. With the institution of a compulsory system of
insurance and vigorous enforcement by the Highway Depart-
ment, the uninsured motorist, it is hoped, will become a thing of
the past. According to the Insurance Department, the $1.50 ear-
marked for victims of uninsured motorist accidents, should prove
to be too high as fewer and fewer uninsured motorists operate on
our highways. 0
B. Assigned Risk Plans
Although the uninsured motorist provisions solved the di-
lemma of injuries caused by uninsured vehicles, another problem
associated with financial responsibility laws became apparent. As
noted earlier, such financial responsibility laws, while not abso-
lutely requiring liability insurance, virtually, if not literally, man-
dated such coverage, thereby filling a social need by providing
protection both for the insured and the innocent victim who
might suffer bodily injury or property damage to his motor vehi-
cle. However, as long as liability coverage was not required, insur-
ers and insureds alike could placidly enjoy a take-it-or-leave-it
attitude toward liability insurance.
It would be fair to say that as a whole the more responsible
and conscientious citizens sought to insure themselves against
the claims and lawsuits of others while the less responsible and
48. No. 312, [1963] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 526.
49. No. 458, [1971] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 854. Although the 1971 amendment contin-
ued the collection of uninsured motorist fees which were channeled into the uninsured
motorist fund, the distribution from the fund was restricted to two purposes-defraying
the administrative costs of the Highway Department and subsidizing highway safety
programs as appropriated by the General Assembly.
In 1973, the General Assembly authorized the fund to also be used to implement a
statewide alcohol safety action program. No. 225, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 260.
50. S.C. DEPT. OF INSURANCE, BULL. No. 17-74, FoST INTERPRP vE BuLiN= ON S-371,
at 41 (July 12, 1974) [hereinafter cited as S.C. DEPT. OF INSURANCE].
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conscientious were not so inclined. With the advent of financial
responsibility laws, virtually millions of heretofore uninsured
risks were suddenly forced on the automobile insurance market
of America. From this situation evolved the insurance industry's
strategy of selectivity and the ensuing problems of availability.
In essence, the larger direct writers5' became highly selective,
accepting only those risks which could be categorized as the
"creme de la creme. " This so called "creaming" or "cream skim-
ming" process produced lower loss ratios 52 which, when combined
with the direct writers' generally lower expense structures, pro-
duced significantly lower premiums for those chosen few who
qualified. The remainder were left to seek "required" insurance
from the "bureau" or "stock" companies, 53 which in turn were
forced to increase and intensify their practices of selectivity in
order to remain competitive with the direct writers. Thus, as the
practice of selectivity spiraled, a sizable portion of America's
drivers found themselves unable to obtain insurance in the volun-
tary market.
Reacting to these pressures, the insurance industry, state
legislatures, and state insurance departments devised a solution
which seemed appropriate at the time. Their solution, the as-
signed risk plan concept, was conceived and quickly enacted in
all 48 states-South Carolina in 1947.11 Under this concept, driv-
ers who were unable to obtain coverage on the voluntary market
applied under the assigned risk plan and were assigned as "unde-
sirable" risks on a rotating basis among companies doing business
in the state. Participation in the assignment system was manda-
tory for all insurers doing business in the state,5 and the number
51. Direct writers are those companies whose marketing system does not include the
use of separate independent agents to whom additional commissions must be paid. In-
stead, these companies contract with agents who write insurance policies only for the
particular company with which they are associated. For example, companies such as
Allstate, Nationwide, and State Farm hire their own agents who write policies only for
that respective company.
52. Generally speaking, "loss ratio" indicates the comparison, expressed in a percen-
tage, of premiums collected against losses paid.
53. Generally, "bureau" or "stock" companies are those companies who contract with
independent agents for the marketing of their coverage. Many rely upon the Insurance
Services Office or "the bureau" to file rates on their behalf, but in any event the rates
charged by the stock companies roughly parallel each other. However, the rates charged
by those companies are usually somewhat higher than those charged by direct writers.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46.719 (1962). Ultimately, all 50 states enacted some form of
assigned risk plan.
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46.719 (1962); AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLANS SERVICE OFFICE,
SOUTH CAROLINA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLAN § 24 (1972).
[Vol. 27
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of assignments was based on the amount of business the insurer
did in the given state.56
However, the second class treatment and higher rates af-
forded those relegated to the confines of the plans soon gave rise
to cries for reform. The industry maxim that "an underwriter
never gets fired for saying no" soon forced millions of "clean"
risks57 into assigned risk plans around the country. Indeed, in the
early 1970's some 4 million insureds found themselves thrust into
assigned risk plans, even though approximately 2.7 million were
"clean" risks.58 Paradoxically, figures indicated that 3.6 million
of the 4 million assigned risk insureds had no accidents in a given
year.59
In South Carolina abuses and discrimination reached such
proportions that the assigned risk plan became a major campaign
issue in the 1970 gubernatorial election. In that election, then Lt.
Governor John C. West waged a vigorous campaign promising to
find a reasonable substitute for South Carolina's assigned risk
plan. At that time, South Carolina had the dubious distinction
of the second largest percentage of assigned risk plan insureds in
the nation.' Shortly after the 1970 election, Governor West ad-
dressed a joint session of the General Assembly solely on the topic
of automobile insurance and urged South Carolina solons to initi-
ate immediate reforms.62
56. See note 55 supra.
57. A "clean" risk is one who has not had an accident or committed any chargeable
driving violation during the previous 3 years.
58. FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
FULL INSURANCE AVAILABILITY 2, 3 (Sept., 1974) [hereinafter cited as FULL INSURANCE
AvAILABILITY].
59. Id. at 2.
60. Interview with John C. West, former Governor of South Carolina, June 18, 1975.
61. FULL INSURANCE AvAiLABILrrY, supra note 58, at 49-50. By the industry's own
figures contained in its last assigned risk plan rate filing, 65 to 72 percent of the South
Carolina drivers in the plan were "clean" risks by assigned risk plan standards. If gener-
ally accepted voluntary market standards are applied, the "clean" risk figure jumps to
more than 80 percent under voluntary industry standards; an accident involving only
property damages of under $200 is not counted against a driver's "clean" status. In all,
roughly 20 percent of 200,000 South Carolina drivers were forced to seek liability insurance
through the assigned risk plan with the "clean" risk paying up to 80 percent more than
his equally clean neighbor who was fortunate enough to find insurance on the voluntary
market. Further, if the assigned risk insured desired or needed physical damage coverage,
as in the instance of financing his car, he was inevitably forced to seek out the high-risk,
high-rate substandard or nonstandard writer, who specialized in the writing of physical
damage insurance, to supply such coverage, since it was not available under the assigned
risk plan.
62. Address by Governor John C. West to the South Carolina General Assembly, Feb.
18, 1971.
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Responding to the Governor's call for action, the General
Assembly, by joint resolution, 3 created a special joint study com-
mittee64 comprised of senators, representatives and governor ap-
pointees. The Committee quickly launched a series of hearings
and meetings and began working on drafts of legislation. s Follow-
ing the Committee's first report,6 legislation was introduced si-
multaneously in both houses.6 7 The two identical bills proposed
to abolish the assigned risk plan in this state and attacked vir-
tually every phase of the problems which plagued the South Caro-
lina automobile insurance system. Included were provisions
which would establish a Maryland-type state fund in South Caro-
lina." The ensuing debate which raged both on and off the legisla-
tive floors centered primarily around the state fund provisions.
During this period, North Carolina, under the prodding of its
consumer-oriented Commissioner of Insurance John Randolph
Ingram, became the first state in the nation to abolish its as-
signed risk plan in favor of a "take all comers" provision.69 Also
during this period, Federal Insurance Administrator George K.
Bernstein began urging prompt state action to adopt a program
of full insurance availability.7° Legislative leaders, having con-
63. Concurrent Resolution S-674, 99th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (1972).
64. S-674 created the Joint Legislative Committee to Make a Study and Investigation
of Automobile Insurance Plans Including the No-Fault Automobile Insurance System,
more commonly known as the Automobile Liability Insurance Study Committee. Its
members included Sen. J. Ralph Gasque, Chairman; Sen. Walter J. Bristow, Sen. John
Drummond, Rep. Dolphus C. Medley, Rep. Robert W. Kemp, Rep. Robert H. Burnside,
Mr. Kermit S. King, Mrs. Sue B. McElveen, and Mr. Jasper T. Hiers.
65. The Committee has held 77 meetings and made 5 trips to investigate the legisla-
tive programs enacted in other states.
66. COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLANS
INCLUDING THE No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SYSTEM, 99TH GEN. ASSEMBLY OF S.C., 2d
SEss., FIRST REPORT (Comm. Print 1973).
67. S.371, 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 1st Sess. (1973); H. 1039, 100th Gen. Assem-
bly of S.C., ist Sess. (1973).
68. In Maryland, a state owned and operated insurance company was established to
write those risks which could not find insurance on the voluntary market. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 243-243L (Supp. 1974). This system was bitterly opposed in South
Carolina by all segments of the insurance industry which viewed the state fund concept
as an ominous threat to the traditional enterprise system. See SECOND REPORT, supra note
6, at 3.
69. North Carolina, in enacting a system of compulsory insurance, also provided for
a Reinsurance Facility. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.26 etseq. (1975). Massachusetts and
New Hampshire have followed suit. South Carolina also provided for a Reinsurance Facil-
ity in the Automobile Reparation Reform Act-the operation of the Reinsurance Facility
will be discussed at a later point in this paper.
70. Full insurance availability contemplates elimination of the separate assigned risk
market and the integration of all risks into a single voluntary market in which holders of
16
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ferred at length with Commissioner Ingram and Mr. Bernstein,
were impressed with this concept.71 Based on the recommenda-
tions of the Study Committee, legislation was introduced replac-
ing the state fund plan with a system of Full Insurance Availabil-
ity.72 Again, the insurance industry was divided in its attitude
toward the new proposal, but a substantial portion opposed the
measure with the same vigor that it had opposed the state fund.
valid drivers licenses would be free to choose the agent and the company from which they
wish to obtain coverage. Companies, however, which do not desire to retain particular
risks on their books would be permitted to reinsure such risks through a pooling arrange-
ment, and the losses of those risks would be shared on a proportionate basis by the
industry as a whole. FULL INSURANCE AVAILABILTY, supra note 58, at 9-16.
71. Howard B. Clark, former South Carolina Chief Insurance Commissioner, was
serving during this period under Mr. Burnstein as Deputy Administrator and deserves
much of the credit for developing the final concept of full insurance availability. He visited
his home state of South Carolina on numerous occasions urging the state to adopt full
insurance availability legislation. Later, on January 14, 1974, he was appointed Chief
Insurance Commissioner of South Carolina and continued to wage a vigorous campaign
for the adoption of full insurance availability. Mr. Clark resigned his position with the
South Carolina Insurance Department, effective June 15, 1975, and has returned to the
Federal Insurance Administration as Deputy Administrator.
72. The first S.371 insurance bill which was drafted by the original Study Committee
was introduced in the Senate on April 19, 1973, and referred to the Committee on Banking
and Insurance. On June 12, 1973, debate on this piece of legislation was adjourned until
January 1, 1974. In June of 1973, S.397, 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 1st Sess. (1973),
increased the membership of the Committee to 15 by adding Sen. Paul M. Moore, Sen.
Edward E. Saleeby, Rep. Nick A. Theodore, Rep. A. Lee Chandler, Dr. Paul D. Weston,
and Mr. E.S. Ervin. The enlarged Committee met for the first time on August 1, 1973.
During January of 1974, the Committee decided to completely rewrite the original S. 371.
The second version of S. 371, which as amended later became the Automobile Reparations
Reform Act, was introduced on January 8, 1974. On that date, it was specially ordered
for debate on January 22, 1974. On February 6, 1974, it was recommitted to the Banking
and Insurance Committee and favorably reported out with amendments on the 7th of
February 1974 and passed by the Senate on the 12th of February, 1974. It was introduced
into the House on February 13, 1974 and was committed to the Labor, Commerce and
Industry Committee. On March 7, 1974, the Committee reported the bill out with a
favorable majority. The bill was continuously debated from March 21 to April 4, 1974. Its
second reading was received on April 4, 1974, and the third reading on April 9, 1974. On
April 10, 1974, it was sent to a conference committee composed of Senators Gasque,
Moore, and James M. Morris, and Representatives Chandler, Theodore, and James H.
Moss. It came back from the conference committee on June 28, 1974 and the conferrees
were granted free conference powers by their respective chambers on the same day. S.
JouR. 2048 (daily ed. June 28, 1974), and H.R. JouR., Vol. 11, 2653 (daily ed. June 28,
1974). On the 29th of June, 1974, the House received and adopted the Free Conference
Report of the conference committee, H.R. JOUR., Vol. 11, 2728 (daily ed. June 29, 1974);
the Senate received the Free Conference Report on June 29, 1974. S. JOUR. 2058 (daily
ed. June 29, 1974), and adopted the report on July 2, 1974, S. JOUR. 2147-48 (daily ed.
July 2, 1974). The bill was enrolled for ratification and signed into law by the Governor
on July 9, 1974.
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Opponents argued that integration of the voluntary and involun-
tary market would penalize voluntary market insureds by in-
creasing their rates. 3 This would result, they said, from placing
the highly rated "clean" assigned risks in the-voluntary market.
Proponents pointed to the discriminatory nature of the as-
signed risk plan and cited the energy crises and other factors
which would tend toward stabilizing or reducing rates.74 They
argued that such a situation presented an opportune time to elim-
inate once and for all the inequities of the assigned risk plan.
Opponents in the meantime began to push their own joint under-
writing association concept and legislation to establish such an
association was soon introduced. 5
Despite vigorous and heated debate, nonidentical versions of
the bill (S.371) finally passed both houses" and were sent to a
joint conference committee. Although substantial differences ex-
isted between the two versions," full insurance availability provi-
sions were safely intact in each of them. The conference commit-
tee debate centered primarily upon the reparations or no-fault
issue and the issue of establishing a statutory rating bureau.18 No
one' on the committee seriously questioned the provisions estab-
lishing a system of full insurance availability. A compromise was
hammered out and a single version was approved by both houses
73. H.R. JouR., Vol. I, 1114-22 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1974); Minutes of the House Labor,
Commerce, and Industry Comm., 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (Feb. 12, 1974).
74. Minutes of the Automobile Liability Insurance Study Committee, 99th Gen. As-
sembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (Nov. 11, 1973 and Dec. 5, 1973).
75. Under the joint underwriting association or "servicing carrier" concept, a small
number of companies (e.g., six to ten) volunteer to write and service the undesirable risks,
maintaining records and books apart from their regular books of business. The losses and
expenses of these risks are shared proportionately by all insurers. At the present time,
Florida, Hawaii, and Missouri have "service carrier" plans.
76. See note 72 supra.
77. For example, the House version, unlike the Senate bill, contained a medical
threshold of $500 in medical expenses as a prerequisite for a suit in tort. H.R. Jour., Vol.
I, 982-88 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1974). Also, the House expunged from its version a Senate
provision for a Rating and Statistical Bureau which would promulgate a uniform pure loss
component. H.R. JouR., Vol. I, 992-93 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1974). When the bill went to
the conference committee, the conferees adopted a State Rate and Statistical Division as
part of the South Carolina Department of Insurance and gave the new bureau the author-
ity to determine, but not promulgate, the pure loss component. Minutes of the Conference
Committee on S-371, 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess., at 3-8 (May 15, 1974). The
operation of the Division will be discussed in Part I, B, of this paper.
78. Minutes of the Conference Committee on S-371, 100th Gen. Assembly of S.C.,
2d Sess. (May 29, 1974, June 5, 1974, June 12, 1974, June 13, 1974, June 19, 1974, June
26, 1974, and June 28, 1974).
[Vol. 27
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of the General Assembly.79 The bill was signed into law by Gover-
nor West on July 9, 1974,8o with most of its provisions taking effect
on October 1, 1974.81
III. COMPULSORY INSURANCE
By enacting a system of full insurance availability, the 1974
South Carolina General Assembly joined the growing number of
states8 2 which have enacted compulsory insurance. The purpose
of compulsory insurance laws, like that of financial responsibility
laws, is to provide a financially responsible defendant for every
person injured in a motor vehicle accident. Compulsory laws,
however, are preventive legislation rather than remedial. Their
provisions become operative when a motor vehicle is registered
and not merely upon the subsequent occurrence of an accident.
Generally, these provisions require all owners of automobiles to
produce an insurance policy before license and plates may be
issued.13 Thus, in essence, these laws incorporate mandatory fin-
ancial responsibility requirements as a prerequisite to owning and
operating a car.8
In 1925, Massachusetts became the first state to enact a
system of compulsory liability insurance."5 Although originally
attacked by laymen as well as the insurance industry itself, the
Massachusetts statute has remained virtually unchanged since
79. See note 72 supra.
80. No. 1177, [1974] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2718.
81. Id.
82. Today, a total of 20 states have enacted a form of compulsory insurance. A
number of these states made liability insurance compulsory under no-fault legislative
enactments, whereas others amended their financial responsibility laws to require owners
to demonstrate the minimum limits of financial responsibility as a condition to registering
their motor vehicles. Among those states which have mandatory provisions are California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Utah. See Chart, AM. INS. Ass'WN., ANALYSIS OF
LAws RELATING TO AUrOMOBILE INSURANCE (Dec., 1974).
Generally, compulsory insurance laws only mandate bodily injury and property dam-
age coverage for victims of the insured. These statutes do not require the driver to obtain
physical damage coverage on his own automobile.
83. As an alternative, the various laws generally allow the owners to file cash, bond,
or collateral in an amount equal to the minimum insurance contract's limits of liability;
however, obtaining an insurance policy is the only pragmatic method of demonstrating
one's financial responsibility under compulsory statutes. D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL
INSURANCE 665 n.27 (9th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as D. BicKELHAUPT].
84. Id. at 665.
85. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34 (1925).
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that early date. Almost 30 years passed before New York, in 1956,
enacted the second compulsory insurance statute in the United
States." However, today, less than 20 years later, 20 states have
incorporated mandatory provisions in their automobile insurance
statutes."'
The South Carolina compulsory insurance law, which is
found in Article IV of section I of the 1974 Automobile Reparation
Reform Act, is not unlike the basic provisions of the earlier com-
pulsory statutes. Under the South Carolina provisions, every per-
son at the time of registration and licensing of a motor vehicle
must declare the vehicle to be an "insured motor vehicle" 8 and
further execute and furnish to the Highway Department a certifi-
cate that the motor vehicle is an "insured motor vehicle" upon
which insurance will be maintained during the registration pe-
riod. 9 In order to qualify as an "insured motor vehicle," an insur-
ance policy meeting the minimum requirements of section 46-
750.11 of the Code" must be obtained on the automobile by the
person applying for the vehicle's registration. Although the com-
pulsory statutes of the other states generally allow alternative
means of demonstrating financial responsibility, this statute de-
fines the required security only in terms of insurance.' However,
86. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, 93 (Supp. 1958).
87. See note 82 supra.
88. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 1, art. IV, § 1. This section refers to Section
10 of Article II for the definition of the required security maintained on an insured motor
vehicle. This reference is incorrect-the intended reference is to Section 9 of Art. II. S.C.
DEPt. OF INSURANCE, supra note 50, at 16.
89. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 1, art. IV, § 2.
90. Prior to the 1974 Act, Article 5 of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
set the minimum limits of bodily injury and property damage liability insurance policies
at $10,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident, and,
subject to such limit for one person, $20,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two or
more persons in any one accident, and $5,000 because of injury to or destruction of
property of others in any one accident. Section 4 of the 1974 Act, in response to increasing
inflation, amended these limits upward to $15,000 for injuries sustained by one person and
to $30,000 for two or more persons. The minimum limits for property damage remained
at $5,000.
91. Chapter 2 of Title 46 of the South Carolina Code had provided for the registration
and licensing of uninsured motor vehicles. Section 46-135 of Chapter 2 provided that an
insured motor vehicle was one (1) upon which there was bodily injury liability and prop-
erty damage liability insurance issued by a carrier authorized to do business in the state,
(2) upon which a bond had been given or cash or securities delivered in lieu of insurance,
or (3) whose owner qualified as a self-insurer. Thus, under this provision an owner could
operate his automobile if he met one of these stated alternatives. Additionally, section 46-
136 of Chapter 2 allowed an uninsured motorist to register his car and obtain his license
plates if he paid an uninsured motorist fee. With the enactment of the 1974 Act, which
20
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the Act does allow the Commissioner to approve and accept an-
other form of security in lieu of a liability insurance policy if he
finds that such other form of security provides the benefits re-
quired by this Act. 2 Although this provision might appear to
allow the owner 'or operator numerous alternative methods of
demonstrating security, the language has been construed nar-
rowly. According to the Insurance Department's Interpretative
Bulletin, the only other form of security which would be approved
would be a form of self-insurance which would provide first-party
benefits as well as covering the self-insurer's potential liability. 3
The Act provides stiff penalties for those who try to circum-
vent its requirements. Section 7 of Article IV of section I provides
that any person who knowingly makes "a false certificate as to
whether a motor vehicle is an insured motor vehicle" or presents
to the Highway Department "false evidence that any motor vehi-
cle sought to be registered is insured," is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Upon conviction, the person may either be fined not less than $50
nor more than $100 or imprisoned from 10 to 30 days. Further,
the Highway Department may deny registration of the person's
motor vehicle and may also refuse to reissue his license for a
period of 6 months. If the owner of a motor vehicle upon which
the registration and license plates have been suspended sells the
automobile to any member of his family who resides in the house-
hold, he is guilty of a misdemeanor for which he may be fined
$100 and imprisoned for 30 days. 4 Section 8 of Article IV of sec-
tion I makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly operate an uninsured
motor vehicle, and a fine of $100 and imprisonment for 30 days
may be imposed upon conviction. Furthermore, subsequent to the
conviction of one operating an uninsured motor vehicle, the High-
way Department is authorized "to suspend the driving privilege
and all license plates and registration certificates issued in such
person's name for a period of thirty days."95 The privileges of the
motorist are not to be reinstated until proof of his financial re-
sponsiblity has been filed. Although not specifically defined in
the Act, it would seem to be clear that proof of responsibility here
requires one to obtain insurance as a condition precedent to registering his motor vehicle,
Chapter 2 of Title 46 was repealed in toto.
92. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 1, art. II, § 9.
93. S.C. DEPT. OF INSURANCE, supra note 50, at 17.
94. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 1, art. IV, § 5.
95. Id. § 1, art. IV, § 8.
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refers to the proof required under South Carolina's Financial Re-
sponsibility Law.9
Prior to the enactment of the Automobile Reparation Reform
Act, an insurance company was required to notify the insured 60
days in advance of the company's cancellation or refusal to renew
an insurance policy." No restrictions were placed on the insurer's
right to non-renew or to cancel an insurance policy. However, if
the insurer refused to renew or cancelled due to (1) the nonpay-
ment of premiums or (2) the loss by suspension or revocation of
a driver's license or vehicle registration by the named insured or
another operator of the insured's household, the notice had only
to be given 15 days prior to its effectiveness. 8 With the enactment
of the Automobile Reparation Reform Act, insurance companies
are not allowed to cancel with impunity but rather are forbidden
to refuse to write or to renew automobile insurance policies unless
(1) the operator's permit has been revoked or suspended, (2) there
exists a valid and enforceable outstanding judgment due to the
failure of the applicant to pay insurance premiums, or (3) the
principal operator or insured has simply failed to pay insurance
premiums when due. Section 3 of Article IV of section I states
that the notice required under section 46-750.65 of the Code is to
be continued.' 9 Thus, in attempting to read the existing code
together with this provision of the Automobile Reparation Reform
Act, it is first necessary to note that the 60 day-rule is no longer
of use since it applied to those cases where the companies were
free to cancel or refuse to renew at will. Apparently, the 15 day
notice requirement is to be continued for those situations in
which the companies are allowed to cancel or not renew the pol-
icy. Aware of the fact that the present code only requires the
notice to be given to the insured on policies as defined in section
46-750.61,'1' the drafters added a 30 day period of notice for all
96. S.C. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, supra note 50, at 20.
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.65 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
98. Id.
99. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 3, art. III, § 1.
100. In addition to providing for the 60 day and 15 day notice rules, the code also
requires that the notice must state the reasons for the insurer's action and advise the
insured both of his right to review and of his possible eligibility for insurance through the
assigned risk plan. Since the assigned risk plan was abolished by the Automobile Repara-
tion Reform Act, it is an unfortunate oversight that the General Assembly did not rewrite
section 46-750.65 to conform to the 1974 Act.
101. Section 46-750.61 defines "policy" to mean an automobile liability policy which
is delivered or issued for delivery in South Carolina and which insures a single individual
[Vol. 27
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policies not covered under existing law'0 2 and further provided
that such notice must be forwarded to the insured at his desig-
nated address by either certified mail or by regular mail when
evidenced by a post office receipt form.
10 3
Detailed responsibilities are imposed in the event of a motor
vehicle being or becoming uninsured during the period in which
it is licensed. The statute provides that immediately upon the
cancellation or expiration of insurance policy, the owner must
reobtain insurance on the vehicle.0 4 If insurance has not been
obtained within 5 days subsequent to the effective date of the
cancellation or expiration of the policy, the owner is required to
or husband and wife who are of the same household. The only types of vehicles which may
be designated include (1) private passenger or station wagon automobiles which are not
used as public or livery conveyances for passengers or rented to others or (2) any other
four-wheel motor vehicle with a load capacity of 1500 pounds or less which is not used in
the occupation, profession or business of the insured. The definition specifically excludes
application of (1) any policy issued under an assigned risk plan, (2) any policy-insuring
more than four automobiles, (3) any policy covering garage, automobile sales agency,
repair shop, service station or public parking place operation hazards, or (4) any other
contract which provides insurance to an insured and incidentally provides insurance with
respect to such motor vehicles. Again, the reference to "policies issued under the assigned
risk plan" is an unfortunate carry-over. In order to avoid confusion in future times, the
General Assembly should amend this definition to conform to the provisions of the 1974
Act.
102. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 1, art. IV, § 3. Insurance policies not
covered under the existing code and which would require the 30 day notice of the 1974
provision would most likely include policies covering physical damage insurance. Physical
damage insurance policies basically provide collision and comprehensive coverages, with
or without deductibles. Collision pays for damage to the insured's own automobile result-
ing from an automobile accident. Comprehensive coverage pays for other damage to the
insured's own automobile such as, for example, that resulting from vandalism. If a deduct-
ible amount is in effect for either or both of the coverages, the insurer is not responsible
for paying the amount of the deductible. Although the Aut6mobile Reparation Reform Act
in Section 1, Article Il, section 3(c) provides for mandatory offering of collision insurance
coverage by the companies, it is not required to be purchased by the customer. Neither
the present code nor the Automobile Reparation Reform Act affect the company's right
to not renew or cancel collision or comprehensive insurance. However, in order to protect
the consumer the drafters provided the 30 day notice requirement to allow him time to
obtain this coverage.
103. In prescribing the specific means by which to effect notice, the Automobile
Reparation Reform Act departs from the earlier code. Although as previously discussed,
the existing code did require the company to notify the insured of its position to cancel or
refusal to renew, there were no directions placed on the company's notification method.
In light of the consumer orientation of the Act and the finding of the General Assembly
in Section 3, Article Il, section 1, that "automobile insurance has become a legal and
practical necessity for individuals," these protective methods are surely not radical but
rather illustrate the desire of the General Assembly to afford the insured every opportunity
to maintain insurance.
104. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 1, art. IV, § 4.
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surrender the license plates of the motor vehicle and the registra-
tion certificate issued for it.105 Further, when such a vehicle is or
becomes an uninsured motor vehicle, the burden is placed on the
insurance company to notify the Highway Department in writing
within 10 days of the cancellation or expiration."6
The Highway Department, upon learning of the termination
of the policy, is thereafter required "to suspend the license plates
and registration certificate and must initiate, within 15 days of
the notice of cancellation, the necessary action to recover the
license plates and registration certificates."'' ° Once the tags and
certificates have been turned in or otherwise recovered by the
Highway Department, they may not be reissued to the owner
until sufficient evidence of insurance has been filed.' 8 Section I,
Article IV, section 4 of the Automobile Reparation Reform Act
provides special relief to those owners whose vehicles become
uninsured during the period of licensing but who, at the time of
suspension, have been able to obtain liability insurance coverage.
The owner may immediately appeal the suspension to the Insur-
ance Commissioner, who upon determining that the person does
have sufficient liability insurance coverage, notifies the Highway
Department which then voids the suspension.' 9
If, however, upon suspension of his registration and license
plates the owner "refuses" to surrender his certificate of registra-
tion and motor vehicle tags, the Highway Department is author-
105. Id.
106. Id. This notice is specifically stated to be in addition to the notice required under
section 46-720.26 of the Code of Laws. Prior to the 1974 Act, insurance companies were
not required to notify the Highway Department of the cancellation or expiration of a policy
of insurance except as provided under South Carolina Code § 46-720.26. The substance
of this section, which requires a 10 day prior notice to the Highway Department for
certified policies, may now be found in South Carolina Code § 46-702(7)(h) (Cum. Supp.
1973). Under certain circumstances, the Highway Department requires a motorist to pres-
ent a certified policy before registration of the vehicle is permitted. Probably the most
common example of an instance in which extra proof is required is a driver with a previous
license revocation.
It should be noted that Section 1, Article IV, section 4 contains a typographical error.
That section states that the insured must give notice to the Highway Department within
10 days of cancellation or revocation. The correct statement is that the insurer must give
notice. If the statute only required the insured to notify the Highway Department, the
enforcement provisions would be rendered virtually worthless since no insured would
notify the Department. It is integral to the Act that the insurance company provide the
notice.
107. S.C. DEPT. OF INSURANCE, supra note 50, at 18.
108. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 1, art. IV, § 4.
109. Id.
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ized to take possession of these items and the owner must pay a
reinstatement fee of $25 in addition to obtaining liability cover-
age. '10 The "willful failure" of an owner to return his motor vehi-
cle license plates and registration certificate is a misdemeanor for
which one may be charged $100 or imprisoned for 30 days."'
Section 10 of Article IV of section I prohibits the issuance of
any contract or policy of insurance "issued to meet'the financial
responsibility requirements" for a period of less than 6 months.
It should be noted that, particularly in Article IV of Section I, the
statute deals with the required "security" that owners and opera-
tors must maintainto register and operate their motor vehicles.
The section under discussion, however, refers to "financial re-
sponsibility requirements" and seems to be dealing with the type
of financial responsibility requirements contemplated where
proof of financial responsibility for the future is required under
South Carolina's Financial Responsibility Act. One method of
demonstrating one's financial responsibility for the future, which
apparently is addressed here, requires the owner or operator to
obtain a certified policy of insurance. 12 Therefore, it would seem
"that this section is intended to relate to persons required to
furnish certified policies as opposed to those situations simply
involving 'security' evidence of which everyone is, of course, re-
quired to furnish." 3 According to the Insurance Department,
however, a better reading of this section would prohibit such
short-term policies from meeting either the requirements of "se-
curity" necessary to register one's car or "proof of financial re-
sponsibility" as required by the Financial Responsibility Act:
As to that part of the Section which stipulates that policies
shall be issued for a policy period of not less than six months, it
is abundantly clear that policies issued for a term of less than
six months are entirely improper and can and should be prohib-
ited, . . . and without respect to whether such policies are of-
110. Id.
111. Id. Section 6 and Section 9 of Article IV of section 1 authorize the Highway
Department to adopt, promulgate, rescind, and enforce rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and intent of the provisions dealing with compulsory
insurance. In order to avoid abrogating the due process rights of an owner and to provide
him with sufficient notice of what actions constitute a "refusal" as opposed to a "willful
failure," carefully drawn regulations addressing these definitions must be promulgated by
the Department.
112. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-747 (1962).
113. S.C. DEPr. OF INSUANCE, supra note 50, at 20.
1976]
25
Christian: The South Carolina Automobile Reparation Reform Act (Part II): Co
Published by Scholar Commons, 1976
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fered as proof of financial responsibility for the future or simply
as evidence of security . . . Thus, it is certain that, in either
context, policies containing a policy period of less than six
months will not be permitted."'
Section 10 of Article IV of section I further provides that these
short-term policies are prohibited "notwithstanding any power of
attorney which may purport to give the attorney in fact the right
to effect cancellation on behalf of the insured." This language,
therefore, provides a further safeguard by precluding the termina-
tion of a policy within the 6 months period even under a power
of attorney which is generally obtained by a premium service
company."5
Since compulsory insurance statutes require one to demon-
strate financial ability prior to operating one's vehicle, advocates
of these laws maintain they are far superior to the usual financial
responsibility law. Hailed as a "guarantee of protection to the
public against financial loss,""' compulsory insurance statutes
have gained widespread acceptance throughout the nation. The
enactment of compulsory laws, however, does not mean that all
drivers will be insured. Generally, 2 or 3 percent of the motorists
in compulsory insurance states remain uninsured. Among these
are: (1) the hit-and-run driver, (2) drivers of stolen vehicles, (3)
motorists whose policies have lapsed subsequent to the date of
registration, and (4) fraudulently registered cars. Further, inter-
state travel will bring in numbers of motorists whose laws do not
have mandatory provisions."7 Due to this fact, all of the states
(except Maryland) which have incorporated compulsory provi-
sions into their insurance statutes have retained the provisions
dealing with uninsured motorist coverage which allows the inno-
cent victim of an accident involving an uninsured motorist to
collect payments from his own insurer."' Likewise, most compul-
114. Id. Construing this section to include policies other than those obtained to sat-
isfy proof of financial responsibility is really unnecessary. Due to the mandate of coverage,
which is discussed at a later point in this paper, renewals on policies whether written for
1 month or 1 year may not be refused as long as the risk remains an insurable risk.
115. Id. at 21.
116. D. BICKELHAUPT, supra note 83, at 665.
117. Id. at 665-66.
118. If, on the other hand, the injured party was at fault in an accident involving
an uninsured motorist, his only recourse would be to recover under the no-fault provisions
(if any) of his own insurance policy. Article II of Section 1 of the Automobile Reparation
Reform Act provides the recovery allowed under the no-fault provisions of the South
Carolina law. For an analysis of the no-fault provisions, see Note, The South Carolina
Insurance Reform Act (Part I): "No Fault" and Contributory Negligence -A Synopsis
and Appraisal, 26 S.C.L. REV. 705 (1975).
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sory states have also retained their earlier financial responsibility
statutes in hopes that such laws will fill any gaps left by their
compulsory laws.
Although the 1974 South Carolina Legislature repealed that
part of the Financial Responsibility Law which required the filing
of security by an uninsured following an accident, the remainder
of the statute was retained. Provisions in the retained portion of
the statute deal specifically with foreign motorists operating vehi-
cles in South Carolina. Article 4 of the Financial Responsibility
Law contemplates reciprocal agreements among states to sus-
pend the driving privileges of resident drivers with unsatisfied
judgments in sister states."' The first 3 sections of the Article'20
contain the procedures to be utilized under reciprocal agree-
ments. If a person fails to satisfy any judgment within 60 days,
the court in which the judgment is rendered must forward a certi-
fied copy of the judgment to the Highway Department.1 21 Where
the person is a nonresident, the Department will suspend operat-
ing privileges in South Carolina 22 and will forward a copy of the
judgment to the official in charge of the issuance of licenses and
registration certificates in the nonresident's home state.' 2 If that
state recognizes these reciprocal provisions, it will suspend the
license and registration of the nonresident until he makes ar-
rangements to satisfy the outstanding judgment.
The Highway Department will also suspend a South Carolin-
ian's license and registration if he suffers an unsatisfied judgment
in another state. The Department has interpreted section 46-737
of the Code to provide such authority.'- In that provision, the
General Assembly did not limit the Department's suspension au-
thority to only domestic judgments, for the Department is re-
quired "upon receipt of a certified copy of judgment . . . [to]
suspend the license and registration and any nonresident's oper-
ating privilege of any person against whom the judgment was
rendered. . . ." Thus, license and registration suspension is sup-
119. Letter from Walter Safrit, Staff Counsel of American Mutual Fire Insurance
Company, to Margaret Christian, June 30, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Letter from W.
Safrit].
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-735-37 (1962).
121. Id. § 46-735 (1962).
122. Id. § 46-737 (1962).
123. Id. § 46-736 (1962).
124. Letter from W. Safrit, supra note 119.
125. Id.
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ported by any judgment-domestic or foreign. Without this inter-
pretation, article 4 would be of little value, because suspension
in the driver's home jurisdiction is the only method of obtaining
satisfaction of an outstanding judgment.' This procedure, how-
ever, does not present a total solution. As one commentator has
noted:
The problem created by the out-of-state driver has not been
solved for it is small consolation for the uncompensated victim
of such motorist when criminal sanctions are invoked, or the
nonresident's driving privileges are revoked, or his license taken
away in his state of domicile by virtue of reciprocal provisions., 7
In addition, a further gap is recognized by the 1974 Act itself.
Since an insurance policy need not begin at the start of the regis-
tration period, it is quite likely that some policies will be can-
celled or expire without renewal at some point after registration.
In such event, the Automobile Reparation Reform Act requires
the motorist to immediately obtain insurance or surrender his
license plates and registration certificates within 5 days of cancel-
lation or expiration. "2 Although it seems probable that surrender
would be something less than immediate, the authors of the legis-
lation foresaw this problem and provided for prompt enforcement
of the mandates of the Automobile Reparation Reform Act by the
Highway Department. Upon the Highway Department's receipt
of the required notice from the insurer that an insurance policy
has been cancelled or expired, the Department is required not to
reissue registration certificates or license tags for the vehicle
which has become uninsured until insurance has been verified.' 9
Furthermore, the Automobile Reparation Reform Act provides
that:
Upon receiving information to the effect that a policy is can-
celled or otherwise terminated on any motor vehicle registered
in South Carolina, then the Department shall suspend the li-
cense plates and registration certificate and shall initiate such
action as may be required within fifteen days of such notice of
126. Id.
127. Note, Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act of 1956: New York's Answer, 32
N.Y.U.L. REV. 147, 164 (1957).
128. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 1, art. IV, § 4.
129. Id.
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cancellation to pick up the license-plates and registration certifi-
cate.1 0
The Department's central computer is now programmed to ac-
cept notices of suspended insurance policies throughout the state
and publishes a suspension list on a biweekly basis which is for-
warded to a special task force of 16 patrolmen whose sole respon-
sibility is the enforcement of these provisions. 3' While it might
appear that a danger period could exist during which cars may
be driven without insurance, even though they were originally
legally registered, as a practical matter it seems unlikely that this
will occur. Since the Highway Department is required by the Act
to receive a 15 day notice of all insurance cancellations and the
suspension list is published biweekly by the Department and
immediately referred to the special task force, fears of inadequate
enforcement appear unfounded.
A. The Reinsurance Facility
In actuality, the Reinsurance Facility'32 is only incidental to
the main thrust of the full insurance availability plan and acts
purely as an escape valve. For the insuring public of South Caro-
lina, the so-called "mandate of coverage"'33 or "mandate to
write" is the important facit. Beginning on October 1, 1974, each
driver with a valid driver's license and the ability to pay a prem-
ium is free for the first time to choose the agent and the company
from whom he wishes to buy all of his automobile liability and
physical damage insurance.'34 He cannot be rejected, cancelled,
130. Id.
131. During the month of May, 1975, the Highway Department received notice of
15,573 insurance cancellations. Under section 4 of Article IV of Section 1, the Highway
Department is required to give immediate notification to the vehicle owner by first class
mail that if insurance is not reinstated on the vehicle, the owner will forfeit his license
tags. Through this procedure, the Department cleared 8,345 cancellations, either by pick-
ing up the license tags or by verifying that the owner actually had insurance. S.C. HIGHWAY
PATROL, PALMETO PATROLMEN, table 322 (May 31, 1975). According to Emory P. Austin,
Director of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Highway Department, the enforcement
process of the Automobile Reparation Reform Act "is certainly functioning much more
efficiently in getting the uninsured motorists off the highways than were the provisions of
the old Uninsured Motorist Act."
132. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 3, art. V.
133. Id. § 3, art. 11.
134. Section 3, Article III, section 1 provides the general mandate. Section 3, Article
Ill, section 2 additionally provides that insurers may make no distinctions in their decision
to write insurance except those "relevant to and reflected in insurers' rating classifications
1976]
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or nonrenewed so long as he retains his driver's license and pays
the premium. Nor can he be discriminated against in any fashion,
such as an insurer's offering special premium finance plans to
some customers and refusing them to others.1 5 Standing behind
this new concept of availability is the South Carolina Reinsur-
ance Facility directed by a board of governors appointed by the
Chief Insurance Commissioner and the Governor.'36 Under the
new system, an agent has no choice but to accept an application
from any insurable risk and send it to the company of the in-
sured's choice which he represents.' 7 However, at the company
underwriting level, a decision can be made to reinsure any risk
which the company does not wish to retain in its books of busi-
ness.'38 Actually a paper transaction, the company sends the
premium, minus the actual expense it incurs in writing and serv-
icing the risk, to the reinsurance pool. The pool then bears any
loss which the risk incurs, but the company and its agent con-
tinue to service the risk. Expenses and losses, or profits should
there be any, are borne by all companies doing business in South
under risk and territorial classification plans promulgated by the [Insurance] Commis-
sioner and approved by the [Insurance] Commission."
135. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 3, art. I, § 2. See also id. § 13.
136. Section 3, Article V, section 9 provides that the operations and affairs of the
Reinsurance Facility are to be under the direction and control of a Governing Board of 15
persons. The Governor 'of South Carolina is authorized to appoint three members to
represent consumers, and the Chief Insurance Commissioner is directed to appoint twelve
of the members. Eight members of these twelve are required to be appointed to represent
the insurance industry-two who represent the American Insurance Association, two who
represent the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, two who represent the National Asso-
ciation of Independent Insurers, one who is a stock insurer, and one who is a nonstock
insurer. In addition this section provides that four persons are to be selected to represent
agents, of whom two represent mutual agents and two represent stock agents.
137. This mandate is contained in Section 3, Article I, section 1, which further
provides that "[elvery such automobile insurance risk constitutes an insurable risk un-
less the operator's permit of the named insured has been revoked or suspended and is at
the time of application for insurance so revoked or suspended; provided, however, that
no insurer may be required to write or renew automobile insurance on any such risk if there
exists a valid and enforceable outstanding judgment secured by an insurer, an agent, or
licensed premium service company on account of automobile insurance premiums which
the applicant or insured or any principal operator who is a member of the named insured's
household has failed or refused to pay unless such applicant or insured shall pay in
advance the entire premium for the full term of the policy sought to be issued or renewed
or the annual premium, whichever is the lesser; nor shall any such insurer be precluded
from effecting cancellation of any such automobile insurance policy, either upon its own
initiative or at the instance of an agent or licensed premium service company, because of
the failure of any such named insured or principal operator to pay when due any such
automobile insurance premium or any installment payment thereof. . ....
138. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 3, art. V, § 1(1).
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Carolina on a basis proportionate to the companies' car year writ-
ings. 39 Important is the concept that neither the insured nor his
agent know whether the insured has been reinsured or not, thus
avoiding the stigma previously associated with the assigned risk
plan.
The reinsurance facility concept is not new. It was intro-
duced in Canada in 1967140 and has suffered a somewhat stormy
existence in that country. The two obvious defects in the Cana-
dian facility are that participation is not mandatory and there are
no restraints put upon utilization of the facility, which results in
substantial "dumping" of risks into the pool.14 '
The South Carolina plan is free of such defects. Participation
in the Facility by all insurers is mandatory.1 2 Likewise there are
definite restraints which prohibit or discourage overutilization
and cites 35 percent or more of an insurer's book of business as a
prima facie case of overutilization. Further, a 5 year weighted
formula adopted by the Board of Governors monetarily penalizes
companies who excessively utilize the Facility and rewards com-
panies who keep risks on their own books."' Finally, an underwri-
ter who ships good business upstream to the Facility will find that
it comes back to haunt him in the form of regular reports issued
by the Facility on the losses of the business reinsured. 45
Perhaps the most serious defect in the South Carolina stat-
ute is that the mandate of coverage extends only to individual
private passenger motor vehicles; hence, there is no mandatory
participation in the statute for small commercial risks. The South
Carolina Insurance Commission, which heartily endorsed the
concept, had recommended that small commercial risks be in-
cluded under the mandate of coverage and be eligible for reinsur-
ance. 4' In the Senate version of the legislation, such a provision
139. Id. § 3, art. V, § 4.
140. 1975 INS. LAW J. 9, 11.
141. Minutes of the Automobile Liability Insurance Study Committee, 99th Gen.
Assembly of S.C., 2d Sess. (Nov. 11, 1973).
142. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 3, art. V, § 2.
143. Id. § 3, art. V, § 5(1).
144. If, for example, an insurer's overall share of the market is 10 percent, but he
reinsures 20 percent of his own book of business, his share of expenses and losses of the
facility will be an average of the two, or 15 percent. Likewise, the aggressive insurer which
expands its writings in contrast to the carrier which constricts its writings, will be re-
warded with a smaller participation ratio.
145. S.C. DEPT. OF INSURANCE, BULL. No. 27-74, PLAN OF OPERATION OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA REINSURANCE FACILITY, at 4 (Sept. 23, 1974).
146. S.C. DEPT. OF INSURANCE, supra note 50, at 24.
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was included but later amended out under the urging of speciality
insurers who write primarily commercial insurance.' It has be-
come obvious since October 1, 1974 that availability for small
commercial risks, such as the corner service station, the "Ma and
Pa" grocery and the downtown florist, constitutes as much of a
problem as the private passenger risk. Action by the Board of
Governors now permits the Facility to accept a limited variety of
small commercial risks,' but legislation would be required to
bring them under the mandate of coverage. In its 1975 Legislative
Recommendations,'49 the South Carolina Insurance Commission
recommended such legislation, and it is currently being consid-
ered for introduction in the 1976 session by the Committee. 5' The
Reinsurance Facility has a far-reaching, progressive quality about
it which cannot be overlooked. Prior to the Automobile Repara-
tion Reform Act, problems of availability plagued only the auto-
mobile insurance system in South Carolina. In other states, how-
ever, particularly those with large metropolitan centers, availa-
bility problems in such lines as fire and homeowners insurance
became prevalent in densely populated ghetto areas. These prob-
lems, in some 28 states, have led to the establishment of Fair
Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plans52 which operate
in similar fashion to assigned risk plans, and, like their automo-
bile insurance counterparts, have become fraught with discrimi-
nations and inequities. One can readily see that availability prob-
lems in those lines, as well as perhaps other lines of insurance,
will inevitably come to South Carolina. When they arrive, the
problem-plagued insurance lines need only be added by statute
147. S. Joun. 430-31 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1974). On June 13, 1974, the conference
committee voted unanimously to include small commercial risks. However, as last minute
opposition gathered strength in the House during the vote to grant free conference powers
to its conferees, the provision was removed by a poll of the conferees prior to the Free
Conference Report. The Free Conference Report did not extend the mandate of coverage
or mandatory participation in the Reinsurance Facility to small commercial risks. S. Joun.
2058-97 (daily ed. June 29, 1974).
148. S.C. DEiyr. OF INSURANC E, ORDEa No. 13-74, at 2, 3 (Sept. 26, 1974).
149. 67 S.C. DEPT. OF INSURANCE ANN. REP. 2 (1974).
150. Interview with William V. Woodson, III, Staff Counsel for the Automobile Lia-
bility Insurance Study Committee, in Columbia, S.C., June 18, 1975.
151. Address by Howard B. Clark, Deputy Administrator, Federal Insurance Admin-
istration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to the Automobile Liability
Insurance Study Committee, Nov. 11, 1973.
152. FULL INSURANCE AvAiLABiLrrY, supra note 58, at 30.
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to the reinsurance facility system and the mandate of coverage
to provide an effective solution.
153
B. The Rate and Statistical Division
It would seem almost axiomatic that a state insurance regu-
latory authority, in order to effectively regulate the insurance
industry, must have current credible statistical data sufficient to
conduct continuing tests and comparisons as to rate levels. In-
deed, in South Carolina, there is a statutory requirement '5 4 that
each insurer doing business in this state submit an annual report
to the Insurance Commissioner on its financial condition and
activity no later than March 1 of each year. However, the annual
reports have heretofore defied meaningful comparison with each
other and with the market as a whole.
All insurance companies operate on systems of classifications
and territories. The classifications are based primarily upon the
use made of the motor vehicle along with such factors as the age
of drivers. Premium levels vary significantly from class to class.
The territorial system, which likewise calls for varying rates from
territory to territory, is then utilized. Finally, if a company uses
a merit rating plan which calls for additional charges for acci-
dents and violations, that plan is added to produce final rates
paid by policyholders.
Prior to the passage of the Automobile Reparation Reform
Act, there was no uniformity in the systems of classifications,
territories or merit rating plans. Thus, insurers utilized a variety
of systems, and many did not even subscribe to any merit rating
plan at all. To further confuse matters, an individual insurer's
statistical plan upon which the annual report was based had only
to be consistent with whatever systems of classifications and ter-
ritories the insurer was currently using. Thus, to analogize, each
153. Availability of medical malpractice professional liability insurance has become
a critical problem in South Carolina. However, unlike lines such as automobile and home-
owners insurance, medical malpractice is not required or desired by the populace as a
whole. Rather, it is designed for purchase only by the few thousand physicians and
surgeons who practice in South Carolina and would not effectively lend itself to a Reinsur-
ance Facility which is designed to provide coverage availability as needed for the entire
population. Thus, acting under authority granted him by an Act of the General Assembly,
No. 306, [1975] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 823, the Chief Insurance Commissioner has man-
dated the establishment of a separate joint underwriting association for medical malprac-
tice insurance, which operates in similar fashion to the Reinsurance Facility.
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-293 (1973 Cum. Supp.).
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year the Insurance Department was barraged with apples, or-
anges, and grapefruit, and asked to make meaningful compari-
sons among them. One need not possess a degree in actuarial
science to perceive that making meaningful comparisons was
impossible.
Recognizing the need for uniformity, the General Assembly
provided authority for the Insurance Commissioner to promul-
gate uniform systems of classifications and territories, a uniform
statistical reporting plan, and a uniform merit rating system. '
Further, it authorized the establishment within the Insdirance
Department of a Rate and Statistical Division to receive the new
uniform data and perform meaningful tests and comparisons.'58
Acting under his new authority, the Insurance Commissioner
immediately has moved to promulgate uniform systems of classi-
fications and territories. 5 ' Relatively simple in nature, a system
of nine classifications and eight territories is mandatory upon all
insurers doing business in South Carolina.'58 It is anticipated that
as uniform statistical data begins coming into the Rate and Sta-
tistical Division, the systems will be modified from time to time
to correspond with the results of tests and comparisons among the
classifications and territories.'59
Further responding to the General Assembly's mandate for
uniformity, the Insurance Commissioner has also promulgated a
uniform merit rating plan.' His plan differs from many pre-
viously in existence in that, with the exception of the initial 15
percent discount for "clean risks," it is predicated upon dollar
amounts rather than percentages.' This approach seems entirely
155. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 3, art. IV, §§ 2, 4.
156. Id. § 3, art. IV. Section 3, Article IV, section 4(a) provides that the Chief Insur-
ance Commissioner through the Rate Division is authorized to fix, establish and promul-
gate a uniform statistical plan or plans as may be necessary for the gathering and compil-
ing of statistical data to enable the Insurance Department to determine a proper rate
within an objective classification based on uniform statistical data.
157. S.C. DEPT. OF INSURANCE, ORDER No. 3-74 (Aug. 1, 1974).
158. The systems were modeled after the then existing systems utilized by the Insur-
ance Services Office (ISO), a voluntary nongovernmental bureau which files rates on
behalf of member and subscriber companies writing approximately 38 percent of the
automobile insurance business in South Carolina.
159. ORDER No. 3-74, supra note 157, has already been amended to expand the 1-C
classification in the Uniform Classification System to include the use of an automobile in
a car pool or other ride-sharing agreement. S.C. DEPr. OF INSURANCE, ORDER No. 1-75 (May
29, 1975).
160. S.C. DEPt. OF INSURANCE, ORDER No. 3074, art. III (Aug. 1, 1974).
161. Id.
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logical in that widely differing premiums are permitted between
the various classifications and territories.
6 2
To insure proper administration of the collection and com-
parison of the new uniform statistical data, it is obvious that a
highly competent staff of statistical technicians would be re-
quired. However, the immediate assembly of such a staff is a
virtual impossibility. Thus, the General Assembly authorized the
Insurance Commissioner to contract at his discretion with an
independent statistical agent to perform all or some of the duties
of the Rate and Statistical Division.' 3 In this regard, a contract
has been executed with the Automobile Insurance Plans Services
Office (AIPSO) on an interim basis, and AIPSO has been ap-
pointed statistical agent for all insurers doing business in South
Carolina. '4
Although even the intelligent layman would understand lit-
tle of the complicated details surrounding the promulgation of
the uniform systems, their importance to the insuring public can-
not be over emphasized, as they will greatly increase and improve
the Insurance Department's ability to effectively regulate the sys-
tem of automobile insurance in South Carolina. For the most
part, future changes which result will be neither revolutionary nor
dramatic in the eyes of the public, but will continually keep in-
surance rates in line within economic realities of the day. It will,
however, take at least 18 months for the Division to gather suffi-
ciently credible uniform data to begin making tests and compari-
sons which will surely result in changes in the various uniform
systems.'65
162. For example, a male under the age of 25 may be charged a premium of $200,
while a 35-year-old married man with no youthful drivers in his family, who uses his car
only for pleasure and to drive short distances to and from work, may find his rate to be
only $100. If both drivers commit the identical violation which would call for a percentage
increase of 10 percent, for example, the young single man will have his rate increased by
$20 while the 35-year-old married man will suffer only a $10 increase. This obvious dis-
crimination does not occur under the Chief Insurance Commissioner's plan in that the
same dollar increase will apply to both drivers.
163. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 3, art. IV, § 4(c).
164. AIPSO is a nongovernmental bureau which administers and files rates for the
assigned risk plan.
165. Address by Claude E. McCain, Chairman, South Carolina Insurance Commis-
sion, to the Automobile Liability Insurance Study Committee, June 5, 1975.
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C. Antidiscrimination and Consumer Protection Provisions66
Enacting a system of compulsory insurance creates a two-
pronged problem. The first prong, which has been previously dis-
cussed, focuses upon the requirement that every vehicle owner
must own an automobile liability insurance policy to compensate
victims who suffer injuries or property damage. The second prong
evolves from the first and centers upon the availability of such
insurance to the motoring public. If liability insurance is re-
quired, a successful compulsory insurance statute must contain
provisions to enable a vehicle owner to acquire insurance without
unnecessary, irrational or undue burdens. Recognizing this need,
the General Assembly has specifically provided for truly full en-
forcement of the Automobile Reparation Reform Act's mandate
of coverage. 6 '
Article VI of Section 3 of the Act is generally addressed to
prohibiting and precluding unfair practices calculated to result in
the evasion of the mandate of coverage to the competitive disad-
vantage of other insurers or with the result of placing pressures
upon the Facility by way of excessive utilization. This Article
makes it an act of unlawful discrimination for any insurer to
make distinctions between policyholders or applicants with re-
spect to coverage, rates, claims, or other services, except for such
distinctions as are provided for in promulgated and approved
classification and territorial plans. 8'
Additionally, an insurer which customarily accepts risks di-
rectly from applicants through employees or exclusive agents is
prohibited from refusing to accept an insurable risk or requiring
that certain classes or types of risk be placed only through some
particular agent or employee. On the other hand, if such an in-
surer customarily accepts such risks through independent agents,
it may not refuse acceptance of an insurable risk from any of its
agents or require that certain classes or types of risk be placed
only through particular agents." 9
Section 3, Article IV, section 2 provides that where an agent
represents more than one insurer of automobile insurance, he
166. Special credit should be given William V. Woodson, III, Staff Counsel for the
Automobile Liability Insurance Study Committee, who is responsible for this section of
the note.
167. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 3, art. VI.
168. Id. § 3, art. VI, § 1.
169. Id. § 3, art. VI, § 2.
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must place the risk with the insurer named or described by the
applicant. If, however, the applicant relies on the skill and judg-
ment of the agent, the agent may place the risk with any insurer
represented by him so long as that is agreeable to the applicant. '7
Because of the manifest danger of collusive agreements calcu-
lated to send certain unwanted classes of risks "down the street"
to some other insurer, the section provides that an insurer is
precluded from making an agreement with any agent or from
offering any such agent anything of value to induce the agent to
place any particular type of risk with any other insurer. Not only
is any such agreement "utterly void" but every such act of collu-
sion or conspiracy is made an act of unfair competition on the
part of both the insurer and agent, which if provided results in a
mandatory suspension or revocation of the license for not less
than a year in addition to any other penalties or liabilities which
might follow from such act. 7 '
An insurer which offers automobile insurance through the
mails is prohibited from restricting its offerings to certain coun-
ties, areas, or zip-code territories, and the Commissioner is au-
thorized and directed to "police" the provision through such ex-
amination of the records as may be necessary. 72
Any act in violation of this Article is deemed an act of unlaw-
ful discrimination and unfair competition which, if willful, re-
quires the suspension or revocation of the offending insurer's cer-
tificate of authority for not less than 6 months, and any agree-
ment made in violation of the section is void.'73 In enforcing the
mandate of coverage, it is clear that the General Assembly in-
tended to prohibit excessive utilization of the Facility for unfair
competition purposes or for purposes of unfairly discriminating
against certain classes or types of risks. The Insurance Commis-
sion is expressly directed to prohibit every such unreasonable or
excessive utilization of the Facility. A prima facie case of exces-
sive or unreasonable utilization is established through a showing
that an insurer or a group of insurers under the same manage-
ment has ceded more than 35 percent of total direct premiums
as reported in the most recent annual statement of such insurer
or group.7 4
170. Id. § 3, art. VI, § 2(1).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 3, art. VI, § 2(2).
173. Id. § 3, art. VI, § 4.
174. Id. § 3, art. VI, § 5(1).
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Finally, the General Assembly made provision for a survey
by the Commissioner at the end of 6 months in response to com-
plaints of want of access or want of outlets for policy producers
to ascertain if sufficient market outlets exist in all areas. Upon
his finding of an. insufficiency of market outlets in particular
areas or that certain producers have been deprived of a market
for risks previously serviced by them, the Commissioner may,
after consultation with the Reinsurance Facility, designate one or
more insurers to service such areas through agents appointed by
them or designate such producers as agents of any such insurer
or insurers.'75
One of the principal consumer protection features of the Au-
tomobile Reparation Reform Act is the unfair claims practices
section.'70 This section establishes a list of practices which, if
committed by an automobile insurer without cause and with suf-
ficient frequency to indicate a general business practice, may
result in civil penalties to the insurer."' Generally, any attempts
at misrepresenting policy provisions relating to coverages, and
any unreasonable delay in responding to claims or communica-
tions regarding claims are prohibited. Additionally, an insurer
cannot seek to compel policyholders to institute a lawsuit to re-
cover amounts due with respect to claims arising under its policy
by offering substantially less than the amount ultimately ex-
pected to be recovered through suit. 178
Anticipating that there might well be some short-term ad-
justment difficulties in the implementation of the Act, the Gen-
eral Assembly empowered the Insurance Commission to hold
public hearings at such times during 1974 and 1975 as it may
select in order to determine whether insurers issuing automobile
insurance policies have realized or may reasonably be expected
to realize unanticipated or excessive profits either as a result of
the effect of the energy crisis or automobile safety engineering
features on loss experience. 179 If the Commission determines, fol-
lowing such hearings, that such profits have resulted or are rea-
sonably likely to result, it must direct the insurers to set aside
sufficient sums in a special reserve to assure the availability of
175. Id. § 3, art, VI, § 6.
176. Id. § 3, art, VII, § 2.
177. Id. § 3, art. VII, § 3.
178. Id. § 3, art. VII, § 2(5).
179. Id. § 3, art. VIII, § 1.
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funds for a fair and reasonable sharing of the excessive or windfall
profits by the policyholders accounting for such profits. The Com-
mission is to credit any insurer which has paid policyholder divi-
dends or has otherwise returned to policyholders such unantici-
pated or excessive profits. The Commission may, if it deems it
necessary or appropriate, establish separate rates of return for
each insurer. 8 ' The Commission may direct that the insurers use
all or part of the described reserve fund to make payment of such
returns and may make such orders with respect to disposition of
the special reserve fund as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this Article. Failure of an insurer to return the
amounts determined by the Commission is made sufficient cause
to revoke the right of that insurer to do business in the state.''
IV. FAMILY IMMUNITY
I' 2
Beginning in 1891 with the Mississippi case of Hewlette v.
George,"3 which involved a charge of false imprisonment, the
American courts adopted a general rule prohibiting the mainte-
nance of actions between a parent and a minor child for personal
torts, regardless of whether the acts were intentional or negligent
in character.' 4 Citing no authorities, the Hewlette court stated,
so long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and
control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and
comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The
peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state,
through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection
from parental violence and wrong-doing, and this is all the child
can be heard to demand.8
180. Id. § 3, art. VIII, § 2.
181. Id. § 3, art. VIII, § 2(1).
182. An excellent discussion of the concept of the parent-child immunity may be
found in McCurdle, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as McCurdle].
183. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
184. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 864 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
It should be pointed out that actions are generally permitted "against one who is not a
parent but merely stands in the place of one, such as a stepfather, or another relative who
has custody of the child." Id. It has also generally been accepted that property tort actions
are maintainable between a parent and minor child. McCurdle, supra note 182, at 527.
185. 9 So. at 887.
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Following the reasoning of the Hewlette court, jurisdictions have
most often offered parental discipline and the desire to prevent
the disturbance of domestic tranquility as the chief reasons in
barring such suits.' 8 This reasoning has been given even in cases
of rape'87 and brutal beatings.' 8
Courts haye also stressed that to allow the institution of such
suits would only encourage fraud and collusion."' Other decisions
have been based on the reasoning that paying damages to one
member of a family would unfairly jeopardize the other members'
right to the family funds which should be used for the benefit of
all."' Furthermore, the difficulty in apportioning any recovery so
that the guilty party does not benefit from his own wrong has also
been voiced as a persuasive reason to deny such actions.' How-
ever, numerous inroads into the common law's broad grant of
immunity soon began to be created as the courts developed var-
ious exceptions to the general rule.
It is generally accepted that an emancipated child may
maintain a suit against the parents for personal torts.' Usually,
the parents' surrender of the right to the child's earnings and
services or of parental control constitutes emancipation.'93 It has
been indicated by some courts that emancipation must be com-
plete in order to remove the immuinity-that the filial ties must
be completely severed. 9 ' And there is authority to the effect that
where the harmful act on which the action is based occurred
before emancipation, the courts have held that the right to
maintain the action must be determined as of the time of the
wrongful act and that the fact of emancipation cannot create a
right of action when none existed at that time.'95
Generally, if an additional relationship has been established
186. PROSSER, supra note 184, at 865.
187. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
188. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
189. See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
190. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
191. Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
192. Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Sanford].
193. Weinberg v. Underwood, 101 N.J. Super. 448, 244 A.2d 538 (1968); Logan v.
Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962).
194. Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953).
195. Sanford, supra note 192, at 837, citing Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114
S.W.2d 468 (1938); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J. 532, 181 A. 153 (1935); Luster v. Luster,
299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938).
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between the parent and child, such as that of master and servant
or carrier and passenger, or if the tort arose out of the business
activities of the parent, '96 the rule of immunity has often been
abrogated. As one commentator has noted:
The theory underlying such a position is that when the tort
arises out of the additional relationship rather than out of the
natural parent-child relationship, the latter relation is merely
incidental or irrelevant and thus should not affect the question
of liability.'97
Another area in which courts allow such suits is in actions based
on the intentionally malicious or wanton infliction of personal
injuries.' 8 The courts rest their decisions on the theory that by
engaging in such wrongful conduct, the parent-child relationship
has been abandoned.'99 These decisions have emphasized that in
such situations the policy generally espoused supporting family
peace has no application, since by the wrongful conduct the fam-
ily harmony has already been destroyed. If the cause of action is
based on actions arising out of the parent's exercising his right to
discipline the child, courts generally deny recovery. ' However,
if the parent abuses the child and his right to discipline, the
courts are divided as to whether or not a child can maintain the
action. 0'
Although these judicially created exceptions do allow injured
parents and minors to sue each other in particular instances,
some courts, in expressly disapproving their earlier decisions, in-
dicated that the immunity's application should be further re-
stricted. 212 Finally, in 1963 Wisconsin abolished the parent-child
immunity except in specifically limited circumstances.0 3 Soon
196. Sanford, supra note 192, at 834.
197. Id., citing Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
198. PROSSER, supra note 184, at 866-67.
199. Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Mahnke v. Moore, 197
Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
200. Sanford, supra note 192, at 836.
201. Compare Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (holding the actions
may be allowed), with McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (disal-
lowing the maintenance of such suits).
202. See, e.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
203. Two areas in which Wisconsin retained the rule of immunity are those involving
the exercises of parental control and authority and those involving parental discretion
concerning food and care. PROSSER, supra note 184, at 867.
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thereafter other jurisdictions, following Wisconsin's lead, repu-
diated the common law immunity by judicial decision."'
In 1974 the South Carolina General Assembly decided to join
this recent trend by providing in the Automobile Reparation Re-
form Act that:
An unemancipated child may sue and be sued by his parents in
an action for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle
accident. In any such action there shall be appointed a guardian
ad litem as provided by law for such child."'
Although limited to personal injuries received in a motor vehicle
accident,0 6 the provision may be logically considered a natural
component of a system of compulsory insurance. Now that all
drivers will carry liability insurance, it becomes very difficult to
maintain the arguments against allowing recovery:
It is apparent that the two reasons which have come to be
regarded as the principal, if not the only, ones for denying a
cause of action in tort between parent and minor child, viz.
danger of disrupting or disturbing domestic tranquility and in-
terference with the exercise of parental rights and the perform-
ance of parental duties in the matter of rearing and disciplining
the child, have no application when the action is, in substance
if not in form, against an insurance company which the action
is not unfriendly, a recovery by the child is no loss to the parent,
their interests unite in favor of recovery, no strained family
relations will follow, family harmony is assured instead of dis-
rupted .... 207
As noted earlier, the fear of instituting collusive suits had been
voiced as a leading policy consideration against allowing the
maintenance of these actions. Although it may be argued that
204. These states include: Alaska, Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Arizona,
Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); California, Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.
3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Hawaii, Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Hawaii
74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Illinois, Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12
(1968); Kentucky, Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Louisiana, Rouley v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. La. 1964); Minnesota, Balts v.
Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); New Hampshire, Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H.
432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); New Jersey, France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267
A.2d 490 (1970); New York, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y. 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529h(1969); and North Dakota, Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (ND. 1967).
205. Automobile Reparation Reform Act § 4B.
206. One leading authority recognized the need for change in the area of automobile
liability insurance. See McCurdle, supra note 182, at 559.
207. Id. at 549.
[Vol. 27
42
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss5/5
INSURANCE REFORM ACT
collusive suits should not be more frequently instituted among
family members than in other situations, 28 it is a valid argument
that the presence of liability insurance (regardless of whom the
parties are) will probably have a significant role in encouraging
suits. Most of the courts which have addressed this problem,
however, have refused to focus on the central question. Rather,
they have gone "off on the narrow technical ground that liability
insurance does not create liability, but only recompenses it when
it otherwise exists. '29 If this theory of reasoning is accepted and
followed, then, as heretofore discussed, only the basic criticism
that a system of compulsory insurance encourages litigation is
again at issue. Certainly, it may be validly argued that if a legis-
lature has overcome the criticisms which are generally voiced
against adopting a system of compulsory insurance, the common
law immunity should not stand in the way of allowing an injured
party to recover damages in situations where the insured could
be subject to legal liability were it not for the parent-child rela-
tionship.
12 0
V. CONCLUSION
With the enactment of compulsory insurance, the South Car-
olina General Assembly has taken what most view as the ultimate
step in eliminating uncompensated victims of automobile acci-
dents. Furthermore, the General Assembly left intact the unin-
sured motorist coverage to protect those who are injured by per-
sons who disobey the law by failing to obtain the required insur-
ance coverage. Also, by retaining certain provisions of the finan-
cial responsibility law, the drafters sought to encourage out-of-
state drivers to obtain insurance coverage. The enforcement pro-
visions are the backbone of the South Carolina insurance
law-efficient operation by the state's administrative arm with
voluntary cooperation of the industry is imperative. However,
equally as important to the Act's success over the long run is the
208. PROSSER, supra note 184, at 866.
209. Id. at 868 (emphasis added). In light of South Carolina's recent abolition of the
immunity by statute, it is interesting to note that the decisions which have addressed the
problem of the conflict which arises by the presence of both compulsory liability insurance
and the child-parent immunity have advocated that a solution be reached by legislative
means rather than by the courts. See, e.g., Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky.
1954); Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954); Schwenkhoff v. Farmers
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93 N.W.2d 867 (1929).
210. McCurdle, supra note 182, at 560.
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General Assembly's decision to continue to channel the necessary
funds to the Highway Department for the specific enforcement of
the provisions of the law.
It would appear that the problem with any omnibus reform
package is that due to the nature of the legislative process
overlaps and omissions are likely to occur. The Automobile Lia-
bility Insurance Study Committee continues to meet on a regular
basis to monitor the progress of automobile insurance reform in
South Carolina, and, therefore, changes in certain areas should
receive prompt attention following the convening of the 1976 ses-
sion. First, in order to protect the accident victim from all poten-
tial tortfeasors, small commercial risks should be brought within
the mandate of coverage both for liability insurance and partici-
pation in the Reinsurance Facility. Second, there are changes of
a purely technical nature that need to be made to avoid redun-
dancy and confusion. Hopefully, such "house-cleaning" amend-
ments as well as action on the small commercial risk problem can
be prefiled to allow for committee study prior to the next legisla-
tive session.
Finally, short-term difficulties are to be expected during the
transition of the South Carolina rating structure to a uniform
basis. However, the long-term benefits to the consumer are pro-
jected to far outweigh any temporary adjustment difficulty in the
change-over. The consumer in South Carolina may expect to
enjoy the benefits which will accrue from a proper rate approved
within an objective classification system based on uniform sta-
tistical data.
MARGARET A. CHRISTIAN
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